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In the century after the 1648 Treaty 
of Westphalia, the European state sys-
tem was established on the basis of the 
political principle of territoriality and of 
the legal principle of sovereign equality. 
The former notion entailed the effective 
control by the major princes within 
established territorial limits and the 
second concept established the norm of 
complete political jurisdiction by the 
prince and his government within these 
territorial boundaries unencumbered by 
any earthly, external authority. Al-
though states were unequal in material 
capabilities and political influence, they 
confronted each other in the interna-
tional arena under the obligation to 
recognize each other as masters within 
their territorial domains. And, in the 
intercourse of nations, agreements were 
to be based on the norm of contracts, 
explicit or implicit, among equal part-
ners, whatever the actual power political 
realities underlying their calculus. States 
organized according to exclusive in-
ternal authority and interstate relations 
organized not by a supranational power 
but by the sovereign agreement of these 
states-this was to be the pattern of 
modern international relations. Linked 
with this pattern were the notions of 
nonintervention and domestic jurisdic-
tion-princes may meet each other in 
battle and adjust the political map of 
Europe but they must resist the urge to 
influence too blatantly the character of 
each other's type of regime and ideo-
logical commitment by direct or covert 
intervention. That this conception of 
international affairs was only im-
perfectly realized is obvious but that it 
provided an influential normative frame 
of action is also clear. 
The evolution of the principles of the 
modern state system is attributable in 
the first instance to the experiences of 
the emergent states from the 14th to 
the 16th centuries. The attempt by the 
various princes to separate their do· 
mains from an empire and a church with 
supranational pretensions and the divi-
sion of Christendom in the reformation, 
suffused the politics of the period with 
a harsh ideological cast and rendered 
problematical political regimes and terri-
torial boundaries, all of which culmi-
nated in the Thirty Years' War. The 
partial stalemate among states and the 
jeopardy in which intervention placed 
every regime persuaded Europe's politi-
cal leadership to evolve a system which 
would better guarantee the stability of 
the states. The key was to separate 
international relations from internal 
politics. The separation was never com-
plete and the smaller states were never 
as certainly covered by the new norms 
as the great states, but international 
relations in rough-and-ready fashion did 
conform to the new pattern until the 
wars of the French Revolution and 
Napoleon. 
With the French Revolution, the 
nature and character of regimes became 
again a stake in the international con-
flict and ideological concerns once again 
interacted with power political motives. 
The defeat of Napoleon largely restored 
the prerevolutionary notions which, 
despite the strains of nationalism, class 
ideologies, and racial doctrines, per-
sisted until World War I. Since that great 
war, however, the world has been buf-
feted by supranational ideologies and 
ambitions cloaked in universal principles 
whose very intensity erodes political 
boundaries and casts in doubt the dis-
tinction between domestic and interna-
tional politics. Moreover, with the rise 
of a multitude of weak and divided 
states unable to establish domestic order 
and resist foreign incursions, the prob-
lem of distinguishing levels of political 
activity and limiting political ambitions 
has been exacerbated. Some have 
further cited the interdependence of the 
international economy as another 
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element -in the erosion of the classical 
principles of the modern state system. 
In such a "revolutionary" situation, 
then, what is the role of the doctrine of 
nonintervention? 
Henry Kissinger and Noninterven-
tion: From Cold War To Detente. In a 
real sense, the cold war is a result of the 
convergence of ideology and ambition 
such as characterized the period prior to 
the Peace of Westphalia and the French 
Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars. The 
Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan 
were thus elements in an increasingly 
global revolutionary struggle the objec-
tive of whose combatants was not only 
extended direct territorial control but 
modification of political regimes and 
socioeconomic structures. In such a 
context, American support, covert and 
open, to liberal political forces in 
Western Europe was seen by the con-
cerned public as both necessary and 
proper. Even the extension of assistance 
to regimes more authoritarian in nature 
was widely seen as a justifiable attempt 
to limit Soviet influence. 
The experiences of Vietnam and the 
political as well as economic costs of 
intervention in areas of high political 
instability led many opinion leaders, 
however, to reassess America's interna-
tional role. There simultaneously oc-
curred a parallel reevaluation by some 
Western commentators of Soviet ambi-
tions. The convergence of these trends is 
most visibly seen in the detente policy 
of the Secretary of State Henry Kissin-
ger. 
If American foreign policy since 
World War II has been largely inspired 
by polar confrontation and doctrines of 
political and economic reconstruction 
and nation-building among the non-
Communist states, recent detente policy 
is aimed in the words of its primary 
expositor, Henry Kissinger, at the en-
couragement of "an environment in 
which competitors can regulate and 
restrain their differences and ultimately 
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move from competition to coopera-
tion.,,1 The primary focus of American 
policy thus becomes less the contain-
ment-and, in effect, isolation-of the 
Soviet Union than the development of a 
nexus of relations which are designed to 
"create a vested interest in cooperation 
and restraint.,,2 And whereas the earlier 
containment doctrine largely repre-
sented a negative policy vis-a-vis the 
East and placed dominant emphasis on 
the development and maintenance of 
alliance ties with Western Europe, 
Japan, and other states of important 
strategic interest, the practical result of 
recent policy is to reverse the emphasis 
and increasingly assess our alliance rela-
tions' in terms of their contribution to 
Soviet-American detente. 
This approach is ultimately founded 
on three assumptions: .First, that in the 
words of the Secretary of State "the 
Soviet Union has begun to practice 
foreign policy-at least partially-as a 
relationship between states rather than 
as international civil war,,3 and that, in 
any case, common interests in survival 
and some degree of predictability are 
more important factors in U.S.-Soviet 
relations than basic changes in their 
regimes or ideological motivations; 
second, that a strong Western military 
posture and a continuing intimacy 
within the Western alliance will be 
maintained; and, third, that a separation 
between domestic and international 
politics and a clearer acceptance of 
spheres of influence in the policies of 
the Soviet Union and the United States 
can be established. 
In a recent reply to those critics who 
assert that political and economic con-
cessions by the United States to the 
Soviet Union should be linked to a 
modification of Soviet domestic policies 
of emigration and, perhaps, dissent, 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
argues: "Where the age-old antagonism 
between freedom and tyranny is con-
cerned, we are not neutral. But other 
imperatives impose limits on our ability 
to produce internal changes in foreign . 
countries. Consciousness of our limits is 
recognition of the necessity of peace-
not moral callousness.,,4 In effect, Dr. 
Kissinger contends that a stable interna-
tional system thus depends in this view 
on an agreement about international 
rules of behavior-not a common notion 
of justice which could well place in 
doubt the authority of the several 
regimes comprising the system. To 
attempt to devise agreements which 
establish both rules of international 
conduct and norms of domestic recti-
tude is seen as likely to increase frustra-
tion and exacerbate conflict, especially 
in an international environment charac-
terized by fundamentally different 
regimes. At the same time, however, it is 
clear that Dr. Kissinger has not elevated 
the doctrine of nonintervention to a 
categorical imperative but limits it to 
great power, i.e., Soviet-American, rela-
tions and couples the notion with an 
implicit understanding on spheres of 
influence. The distinction between 
domestic and international politics and 
the concomitant rule of nonintervention 
are thus prudential and limited rather 
than principles and universal. It is not 
that an absolute doctrine of noninter-
vention is simply rejected in the abstract 
but that conditions of state security, as 
well as state aspirations, are viewed as 
ruling out complete submission to such 
a precept. Indeed, the classical notion of 
power politics has always maintained a 
distinction between great and small 
powers and included concepts of 
spheres of influence. Inhibitions on 
ideological preferences and restrictions 
on direct interference in domestic 
politics arise in this view not from 
abstract notions of justice but from 
caldulations of prudence-which do in-
clude, it must be noted, the elaboration 
of prudential rules of international be-
havior and guides for alliance main-
tenance. In this conception then, Secre-
tary Kissinger is not alone but in a long 
and dominant foreign policy tradition. 
Although the imperative of noninter-
vention is traditionally linked with the 
notions of legal sovereignty and 
equality, all three conceptions are ulti-
mately founded on a situation of inter-
national anarchy and on the principle of 
self-help. Both Naturalists and Positi-
vists historically expressed this rela-
tionship by reference to the doctrine of 
state "rights" which are not.normative 
commands in any meaningful sense at 
all but simply prudential imperatives 
arising from the problem of self-
preservation in the midst of anarchy. 
Such prudential imperatives need not, 
however, be calculations of short-term 
self-interest but in fact may demand 
attention to some modicum of predicta-
bility and order in the international 
sphere and thus concern for the long-
term implications of state actions. While 
anarchy may imply self-help, scholars 
and statesmen alike have been con-
cerned with informing the notion of 
self-help with such restraints and limita-
tions that it does not also entail chaos. 
Nonintervention is thus recommended 
less by reference to legal commitment 
than to prudential calculations.5 
The Soviet Polity, Peaceful Co-
existence, and the Doctrine of Noninter-
vention. The concept of noninterven-
tion espoused by Secretary Kissinger 
appears therefore to be motivated by 
calculations of prudence and qualified 
by an implicit doctrine of spheres of 
influence. An important question is 
whether or not the Soviet Union is 
animated by similar considerations. On 
the face of it, the statement by Leonid 
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the 
Soviet Communist party, before The 
Conference on Cooperation and Se-
curity in Europe appears to accept a 
more unqualified and principled com-
mitment to nonintervention. Speaking 
of the conference and its final act, Mr. 
Brezhnev declared: 
The experience of the work of the 
conference provides important 
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conclusions for the future too. 
The major one that is.reflected in 
the final document is this: No one 
should try to dictate to other 
peoples, on the basis of foreign 
policy considerations of one kind 
or another, the manner in which 
they ought to manage their in-
ternal affairs. It is only the people 
of each given state, and no one 
else, that has the sovereign right 
to resolve its internal affairs and 
establish its internal laws. A dif-
ferent approach is a flimsy and 
perilous ground for the course of 
international cooperation.6 
By reiterating a principal provision of 
the conference declaration, some dele-
gates were led to wonder whether Mos-
cow was signaling its intention to forego 
its prerogative to intervene militarily in 
East Europe in order to maintain Com-
munist governments friendly to the 
Soviet Union. Although Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson of Great Britain felt that 
such a declaration by the General Secre-
tary would make invocation of the 
so-called Brezhnev doctrine more diffi-
cult in the future, most observers ap-
parently believed that the real intent of 
the statement was to inform the West 
that the human rights section of the 
conference declaration could not be 
used to press for the liberalization of 
the East European regimes. If this latter 
interpretation is accepted, it might still 
be argued that Brezhnev was, however, 
prepared to accept a generalized non-
intervention doctrine also qualified by a 
sphere of influence notion. If so, this 
convergence of views, along with the 
fear of nuclear war, might provide a 
basis for a long-term Soviet-American 
detente. One can be excused for some 
degree of skepticism on this point as 
well. 
The Soviets have consistently insisted 
that "the sphere of class and national-
liberation struggle" cannot be brought 
within "peaceful coexistence" and that, 
indeed, detente has given "a powerful 
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impulse to the national-liberation move-
ment of colonial and oppressed 
peoples. " Brezhnev has argued that 
detente is a result of "a new relationship 
of f-orces"-that is, the ascendency of 
the Soviet-Socialist forces. Hence, as an 
Izvestia commentator recently con-
tended, "the process of detente does 
not mean and never meant -the freezing 
of the social-political status quo in the 
wqrld" and in fact nothing cQuld .or 
should prevent the Soviet Union from 
giving "sympathy, compassion, and sup-
port" to these forces of "national-
liberation." In this view, then, detente 
or peaceful coexistence involves direct 
state relations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, particu-
larly in the strategic area, but is not 
designed to prevent Soviet support for 
"favorable developments" in various 
third states.7 
The American Polity, Contemporary 
International Politics, and the Doctrine 
of Nonintervention_ If some commenta-
tors doubt the commitment of the 
Soviet regime to a doctrine of noninter-
vention, even one qualified by notions 
of spheres of influence, we can also 
justly raise questions whether such a 
doctrine is compatible with the charac-
ter of the American polity. In a remark-
able article entitled "Was Woodrow 
Wilson Right?" Daniel P. Moynihan 
argued: 
Wilson conceived of patriotism 
not as an instrument of the state, 
but as an expression and exten-
sion of the moral capacities of the 
individual, specifically of men 
seeking freedom in its many mani-
festations. He saw that in the age 
then commencing such a patriot-
ism would be meaningful only as 
it manifested itself in a world 
setting, engaging its energies in a 
world struggle. Democracy in one 
country was not enough simply 
because it would not last. In 
20th-century America Wil-
sonianism has been disparaged for 
enthusiasm, much as high Angli-
cans disapproved of the Meth-
odists of 18th-century England. 
And yet the Methodists, had they 
been ordained, almost surely 
would have kept the English 
people in the church, and possibly 
also their bishops. Instead the 
people wandered away into 
nothingness. Does not the Ameri-
can faith in democracy face some-
thing of this dilemma, and are we 
not adopting much the same 
course at the silent behest of men 
who know too much to believe 
anything in particular and opt 
instead for accommodations of 
reasonableness and urbanity that 
drain our world position of moral 
purpose?8 
Wilsonianism expressed a belief com-
mon from the early days of the Repub-
lic-that the American experiment in 
government was not for the United 
States alone but provided a standard 
and harbinger for the nations of the 
world. Thomas Jefferson, reflecting on 
the meaning of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, wrote in 1826: 
May it be to the world what I 
believe it will be: to some parts 
sooner, to others later, but finally 
to all-the signal of arousing men 
to burst the chains ... The mass 
of mankind has not been born 
with saddles on their backs for a 
favored few, booted and spurred, 
ready to ride them by the grace of 
God but to govern themselves by 
the grace of God, and they will by 
the grace of God.9 
Abraham Lincoln speaking of the 
Declaration in 1861 expressed a similar 
belief: "Something in that Declaration 
[gave] liberty, not alone to the people 
of this country, but hope to the world 
for all future time. It was that which 
gave promise that in due time the 
weight should be lifted from the 
shoulders of all men, and that all should 
have an equal chance."l 0 Lincoln then 
expressed the belief that, while the 
Declaration offered a vision, it did not 
in itself provide guidance for the con-
struction of free government. That task 
was only accomplished in the text of 
the Constitution of the United States. 
In similar vein, Americans have tradi-
tionally viewed not only the Declaration 
of Independence as potentially universal 
in scope but also the principles and 
structures of constitutional government. 
The American experiment in constitu-
tional democracy has thus been viewed 
not only in domestic but in global 
terms. 
In a real sense, the American ap· 
proach to government and international 
affairs has represented in almost quint-
essential form the modern liberal per-
spective in politics-animated by 
notions fundamentally different from 
those which undergird Soviet and much 
of non-Western society but confident 
that those liberal notions represent the 
basis for just societies everywhere. The 
belief in the universality of rationalism 
and individualism which characterized 
the 18th century Enlightenment re-
ceived its best expression in the Ameri· 
can political experiment and its finest 
rhetorical statement in the words of the 
Declaration of Independence: "We hold 
these truths to be self-evident .... " The 
19th century elaboration of these En-
lightenment principles in the notions of 
the free flow of peoples, goods, and 
ideas became standards by which we not 
only judged the performance of our 
government but other regimes as well. 
To a substantial degree, however, 
confidence in the liberal notion of 
politics and law has been eroded within 
Western society itself and the applica-
bility of such notions to much of the 
rest of the world cast in doubt. It is a 
fact, nonetheless, that the malaise con-
cerning liberal thought affected the rest 
of the Occident earlier and much more 
profoundly than the United States. 
Indeed, a renewed sense of confidence 
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was kindled after the Second World 
War, very much under the leadership of 
the United States. It is true that in the 
late 1960's, America began to suffer the 
same crisis of confidence which had 
gripped European society earlier. It is, 
however, the contention of such ob· 
servers as Daniel Moynihan that the 
a bandonment of important liberal 
beliefs is not in fact fatalistically reo 
quired by the world situation and that 
such a surrender would be harmful to 
the foundations of the American polity 
itself. If the vision of Wilson can no 
longer be accepted in unqualified 
fashion, neither can it be completely 
jettisoned without damage to the 
American soul and indeed to the quest 
for a legitimate world order. A foreign 
policy whose appeal is primarily to 
realpolitik, power balances, spheres of 
influence, and avoidance of war may in 
this view be not so much irrelevant as 
inadequate. 
Even assuming, however, that Ameri-
can and Western foreign policy should 
be animated by the very principles of 
their own political founding, it is still a 
matter of debate as to what degree of 
external activism and indeed inter-
vention this requires. The United States, 
for instance, as many liberal socie.ties, 
has fluctuated in its policies between 
relative noninvolvement in international 
politics, on the one hand, and messianic 
engagement on the other. In the first 
case, one heard the argument that ex-
ternal political entanglement would 
damage material interests and risk moral 
contamination and that exemplary be-
havior at home would act as a beacon 
and redeeming model for the rest of the 
world. In the case of more extensive 
external. engagement, this was recom-
mended on the basis of direct threats to 
the core values of American society and 
the necessity of reestablishing an inter-
national environment in which the 
natural spiritual and material links 
among peoples would no longer· be 
subordinated to authoritarian control. 
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Indeed, many Enlightenment and 
19th century liberal commentators 
addressed themselves to the question as 
to what conditions, if any, would justify 
not only extensive foreign policy activ-
ism in general but direct intervention 
within other societies. Archetypical ex-
amples of the various approaches might 
be found in the writings of Richard 
Cobden, John Stuart Mill, Immanuel 
Kant, and Joseph Mazzini. 
Basically, Cobden stated the most 
uncompromising theory of noninterven-
tion-one founded on the partiality of 
states in defining universal notions of 
right and on the relative efficiency of 
nonintervention in serving over the long-
run the material interest of peoples. It 
must be noted that a basic assumption 
undergirding Cobden's view was that, 
transcending interstate relations, there 
is a plethora of relations between 
peoples. Goods, people, and ideas are to 
cross frontiers freely, thus ameliorating 
state conflicts and bindjng nations to-
gether: "as little intercourse as possible 
betwixt the governments, as much con-
nection as possible between the nations 
of the world." Hence, coupled with his 
doctrine of nonintervention was a 
liberal world vision which provided for 
the interpenetration of peoples. 1 1 Mill, 
Kant, and Mazzini, while accepting 
much of Cobden's vision, provided in 
varying degrees for a policY of state 
intervention. 
Mill enunciated the doctrines of 
limited humanitarian intervention to 
protect lives and property from barba-
rous acts of violence and to end dead-
locked civil wars and of counterinter-
vention to uphold the rule of noninter-
vention.I2 Kant perhaps eroded the 
limitation on intervention even further 
by his notion that stable rules of inter-
national behavior depend on a radical 
revision of international society into 
republican regimes. Moreover, the 
league of states in Kant's schemes might 
also possess a right of intervention in 
behalf of the republican order. 1 3 
Mazzini completes this evolution by 
arguing that the rule of nonintervention 
had become an instrument of the status 
quo employed by the great powers to 
protect "legitimate" governments while 
restricting transnational liberal ties and 
assistance. I4 In effect, the erosion of 
the Cobdenite principle stemmed from 
the dynamics of anarchical competition 
itself and the conflicting political visions 
of the state actors. 
Although there is little question that 
the counsel of Richard Cobden is most 
appealing to Americans today, it must 
also be noted that the conditions under-
lying Cobden's advice are missing 
throughout much of the world-the free 
flow of peoples, ideas, and goods. The 
transnational society about which so 
much has been written in recent years is 
not really universal in its scope. Indeed, 
much of Henry Kissinger's diplomacy 
might be construed as an attempt to 
establish various links-economic, tech-
nical, political, cultural-between the 
West and the East in such a way as to 
bring gradually the states of Eastern 
Europe into a more transnational 
society, in the preservation of which 
they would then have a stake. The fact 
of the matter, however, is that these 
states are still only marginally con-
nected with that transnational world 
and that much of the character of their 
regimes militates against the same type 
of interlinkages allowed by liberal poli-
tics. At the same time, the homogeneity 
of political principle and aspiration 
which might allow the acceptance of a 
sphere of influence doctrine and limited 
noninterventionism, does appear still to 
be lacking. Indeed, under such condi-
tions, Mazzini's observation that the 
rule of nonintervention may be used to 
protect and legitimize authoritarian con-
trol is apt and much akin to commen-
taries on Brezhnev's public espousal of 
nonintervention. 
In effect, to the degree that the 
United States and the West are still 
motivated by classical liberal notions of 
politics, the counsels of John Stuart Mill 
and Immanuel Kant are likely to be 
attractive-that is, the notion of coun-
terintervention to uphold the principle 
of intervention and the Kantian vision 
of the spread of republicanism as a 
precondition of international stability. 
If in fact Soviet foreign policy is still 
inspired by Leninist political principles 
and the United States is similarly in-
fluenced by liberal perspectives, then 
any detente must be conceived as 
limited in nature and much more closely 
akin to what the Russians call peaceful 
coexistence. The notion of peaceful 
coexistence does not rule out areas of 
cooperation where material interests 
converge or where the fear of de-
stabilizing and potentially suicidal war-
fare becomes dominant. But one must 
be skeptical as to whether anything 
more intimate sustains current Ameri-
can-Sovie.t relations. The belief held by 
both sides in varying degree that "what 
is mine is mine and what is yours is 
subject to historical transformation-
with some fraternal assistance," is likely 
to continue in force. Indeed, the ex-
amples of Portugal, and especially 
Angola, may very well be cases in point. 
Despite announcements on the un-
lamented end of the cold war, we are 
probably still living in a revolutionary 
international system. As Henry Kissin-
ger wrote many years ago: "The charac-
teristic of a stable order is its spon-
taneity; the essence of a revolutionary 
situation is its self·consciousness. Princi-
ples of obligation in a period of legiti-
macy are taken so much for granted 
that they are never talked about, and 
such periods therefore appear to pos-
terity as shallow and self-righteous. Prin-
ciples in a revolutionary situation are so 
central that they are constantly talked 
about."lS 
If the future is to see the continu-
ance of revolutionary clashes among 
different notions of public order, are we 
then subject to the conclusion which 
Kissinger reached in that same earlier 
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study?-"And because in revolutionary 
situations the contending systems are 
less concerned with the adjustment of 
differences than with the subversion of 
loyalties, diplomacy is replaced either 
by war or by an armaments race. ,,16 
The character of nuclear armaments, the 
desire of the superpowers for a modi-
cum of stability in their relations, the 
challenge of other international pres-
sures, and the press of internal demands 
-all these forces may indeed sustain a 
limited detente which impedes war and 
stabilizes arms races. Indeed, it is these 
forces which provide the foundation for 
Kissinger's detente strategy-but it must 
be emphasized that the predominantly 
Hobbesian nature of these inducements 
fails to preclude a rather intense politi-
cal contest which makes talk of non-
intervention and even accepted spheres 
of influence premature. 
Henry Kissinger has, in effect, been 
arguing that the involvement of the 
United States in the complications of 
power politics and equilibrium policy is 
permanent and can only be reversed at 
the peril of our national security. 
Should we either withdraw from the 
game of nations with all of its moral 
contradictions or should we act on 
assumptions of natural harmony, univer-
sal justice, or too blatant a notion of 
American uniqueness, we may 
jeopardize the survival both of our 
political influence and of our national 
values. The reduced margin of our 
power has meant that both a completely 
negative policy of containment toward 
our adversaries or a perception of total 
consensus with our allies will destroy 
our flexibility and endanger our 
national interests. In the past, he has 
argued, 
... we had margin for error 
... we acted as if the world's 
security and economic develop-
ment couId be conclusively in-
sured by the commitment of 
American resources, know·how, 
and effort. We were encouraged-
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even impelled-to act as we did by 
our unprecedented predominance 
in a world shattered by war and 
the collapse of the great colonial 
empires. At the same time the 
central character of moral values 
in American life always made us 
acutely sensitive to purity of 
means-and when we disposed of 
overwhelming power we had a 
great luxury of choice. Our moral 
certainty made compromise diffi-
cult; our preponderance often 
made it seem unnecessary. 1 7 
It is the passing of this pre-
ponderance coupled with the permanent 
necessity to engage in the complex 
maneuvers of diplomatic-strategic rela-
tions which defines our current prob-
lems-and which, in Kissinger's view, 
compels not only a modification of 
policy but a transformation of our 
traditional views of world politics. In 
such a world, we would better see 
ourselves in the European tradition of 
equilibrist statesmen who sought not 
only concert with allies but collabora-
tion with enemies-a world of con-
trolled' conflict and limited cooperation 
rather than a community of justice or a 
world of unambiguous enemies and un-
shakable friends. In Kissinger's view, 
i?creasing' interdependence, declining 
resources, and the rising demands and, 
in some cases, power potential of the 
"Third World" states make power 
politics and the equilibrist perspective 
more rather than less compelling. 
To an extraordinary degree, Kissin-
ger's perspective has defined the prob-
lem not only for the Republican 
Administration but the Democratic 
Party opponents. Although Jimmy 
Carter speaks of a "democratic concert 
of nations" and international human 
rights as a primary focus of American 
policy-themes to which the Adminis-
tration has responded in this Presi-
dential election as well as bicentennial 
year-both Carter and Zbigniew Brzezin-
ski, a Carter foreign policy advisor, have 
appealed to equilibrist notions not dis-
similar to' those of Henry Kissinger. 
However, there still persists a tension 
between Kissinger and his bipartisan 
foreign policy critics which goes beyond 
details of policy. There is what appears 
to be an almost instinctive reaction 
against the implications of Kissinger's 
doctrine for the definition of the nation 
itself. From the beginning of the nation, 
the American polity has been defined 
not only as a nation among nations but 
as a great experiment in government 
with relevance not only to this people 
but to peoples everywhere. Our sense of 
ultimate political harmony arising from 
consent, of the application of rational 
techniques, and of special political 
destiny, are all intimately tied to that 
great revolutionary experiment of 1776 
and its completion in constitution-
making in 1787. In this view, it is not to 
the European past that we should turn 
but to our own. 
James Madison defined the constitu-
tion-making task thusly: 
To secure the public good and 
private rights against the danger of 
[a passionate majority] and at the 
same time to preserve the Spirit 
and form of popular government 
is the great object to which our 
inquiries are directed. 
In similar vein, the foreign policy task is 
to reconcile the soul of American 
democracy with the exigences of in-
volvement in a world which shares few 
of our assumptions. Hostility to Kissin-
ger may in part stem from a belief that 
he is too little concerned with that 
soul-despite his latter-day sermons on 
American destiny and moral purpose-
and too willing, in order to meet the 
demands of international politics, to 
adopt alien political models. In fact, 
however, both the claims of American 
democratic-republicanism and the 
exigences of an increasingly insecure 
globe must be met. As we enter the 
third century of our national existence, 
the task we face is no less complex-or 
exhilirating-than the one faced by 
James Madison and his cohorts. 
It is thus probably unrealistic to view 
detente as foreclosing struggles over the 
character of regimes both within and 
without presumed spheres of influence. 
Debate within Western societies would 
be better directed less toward the desira-
bility of intervention than toward the 
modalities of such involvement. It 
appears inevitable that under current 
conditions this must involve attention 
to tactics of intervention and counter-
intervention. In a world where transna-
tional flows are important and growing, 
the Cobdenite eschewal of state inter-
vention in favor of the interpenetration 
of peoples has much to commend it. 
Where such communication is impeded 
and assistance is rendered to various 
national groups who would further re-
strict the transnational flow of goods, 
people, and ideas, then the problem for 
Western governments becomes the de-
velopment of effective instruments to 
influence the domestic evolution of 
various critical countries. In the current 
debate within the United States over 
how to restrict American involvement 
abroad, including the intelligence 
apparatus of the United States, one may 
lose sight of the fact that the United 
States has an interest in developments 
within certain countries, as indeed does 
the Soviet Union. It is a legitimate 
concern that the modalities of American 
influence be compatible with the very 
principles they are intended to uphold. 
Moreover, an American policy too ex-
clusively dominated by realpolitik may 
have fewer constraints and lead to more 
extensive commitments than one ani-
mated by attention to the first princi-
ples of the American regime. On the 
other hand, if such attention is given, 
then one cannot totally ignore the 
warning of Alexander Solzhenitsyn: 
We are also threatened by the 
catastrophe that the physically 
squeezed, constrained world is not 
allowed to become one spiritually; 
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molecules of knowledge and COm-
passion are not allowed to move 
across from one half of the world . 
to the other. This is a grave 
danger: THE STOPPAGE OF 
INFORMATION between the 
parts of the planet. Contemporary 
science knows that such stoppage 
is the way of entropy, of universal 
destruction. Stoppage of informa-
tion makes international signa-
tures and treaties unreal: within 
the zone of STUNNED SILENCE 
any treaty can easily be reinter-
preted at will or, more simply, 
covered up, as if it had never 
existed (Orwell understood this 
beautifully). Within the zone of 
stunned silence lives-seemingly 
not Earth's inhabitants at all-a 
Martian expeditionary force, 
knowing nothing whatever about 
the rest of the Earth and ready to 
trample it flat in the holy convic-
tion that they are "liberating" 
it.I8 
At the same time, if the character of 
the international system impels concern 
for interventionary policies and their 
prudential and principled limitations, it 
would be a mistake to elevate interven-
tion itself to a matter of first principle 
and general norm of international con-
duct. If the international 'society makes 
it unlikely that Cobden's advice will be 
widely accepted, so one must recognize 
the dangers of too enthusiastically em-
bracing notions of revolutionary inter-
vention and counterintervention. Per-
haps the only position is to maintain 
ambiguity rather than sanction nasty 
conduct or impose impossible rules of 
behavior. In any case, nothing in the 
character of the Soviet and American 
regimes or in the political and economic 
structures of the emerging states indi-
cates that the requisite stalemates, 
tolerance, or internal stability have been 
achieved so that international regimes of 
nonintervention after the fashion of 
Westphalia may yet be established. Pre-
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mature movement in that direction will 
not reaffirm the doctrine of noninter-
vention but will consecrate the victory 
of one form of intervention. 
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